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ARGUMENT
Cross-Appellant Joel A. Flake, Trustee of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust (the
"Trustee"), submits this Reply Brief in support of his cross-appeal. In the sections below,
this Reply Brief addresses two (2) issues raised in the Brief of Cross-Appellee filed by
Marian R. Flake ("Marian"), dated February 6,1999. However, before reaching the merits
of those issues, some preliminary comments are in order.
The Brief of Cross-Appellee is replete with dramatic statements that attempt
to superimpose Marian's, or her counsel's, moral judgments about the administration of the
Trust. It reads less like a legal brief and more like an impassioned essay. Such statements
are inaccurate, irrelevant, and inappropriate for an appellate brief.

The Trustee's

administration of the Trust has been guided by his good faith interpretation of the Trust
instruments and the Orders of the district court.
Additionally, the Brief of Cross-Appellee contains numerous misstatements of
the record. They are too many in number and too tenuous in nature to address them all in this
Reply Brief. However, the Trustee briefly corrects two (2) of them. First, Marian has
confused Phase I and Phase II of the trial. {See Brief of Cross-Appellee, fflf 8-10.) As
reflected in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated July 11, 2001,
it was during Phase II that the trial court considered the interpretation of the 1998 and 1987
Trust instruments, not Phase I. Because Marian offered no evidence during Phase II, the trial
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court dismissed all of her claims except those set forth in paragraph 9 of the Conclusions of
Law. (R. 1155-57, 1160-61.)1
Second, the Brief of Cross-Appellee makes several allegations to the effect that
the Trustee and his siblings want to leave Marian "destitute." Although such allegations are
both argumentative and irrelevant, they are nevertheless inaccurate. The Trustee has
complied with every provision of the Restatement, and the trial court so found. The
arguments boil down to Marian's contention that the provisions of the 1987 Trust
Agreement, rather than the Restatement, govern the administration of the Trust. The facts
and law relevant to that issue were fully set forth in the Trustee's earlier Brief and are not
repeated here.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO FINDINGS OF FACT IN FEBRUARY 2000.
Marian argues that the trial court made "verbal findings of fact" about the
intent of Almon J. Flake ("Almon") during a hearing held February 10,2000. The supposed
findings of fact, set forth at pages 11-12 in the Brief of Cross-Appellee, are simply gratuitous
observations made by the District Judge as a preliminary statement to his findings about the
amount of temporary support to be awarded. Almon's intent was not at issue in the hearing,
only whether Marian was entitled to temporary support and, if so, the appropriate amount.

\See Addendum I to Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, dated January 7,2002.)
2

The trial court expressly reserved ruling on which trust instrument controlled, the only issue
that could have involved a determination of Almon's intent, and simply awarded temporary
support until a trial could be held. (See Brief of Cross-Appellee, 12-13.)
Significantly, the Order Re: Temporary Support entered February 24, 2000,2
which was entered as a result of the hearing in question, and which was prepared by Marian's
counsel, mentions nothing about the supposed finding.

Certainly, if the trial court's

observation had been intended as a true finding, Marian's counsel would have ensured that
the written Order memorialized it. Following trial, the court entered detailed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law which explicitly held that the Court's Order Re: Temporary
Support was thereby terminated. (R. 1160) The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
do not incorporate any supposed findings made at the February 2000 hearing, and Marian did
not object to them on that basis.
The Trial Judge's statement quoted in the Brief of Cross-Appellee, therefore,
was not intended as a finding of fact and was not meant to be binding upon any party. It was
simply a personal observation about how he believed Almon might have responded to
Marian's claim.
Finally, even if the Trial Judge did intend his statement to be binding upon the
parties at that time, his later Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law superceded the

2

Since the Brief of Cross-Appellee fails to include the Order, a copy is contained as
an Addendum to this Brief.
3

statement for the reasons stated above, and this Court should reject Cross-Appellee's
argument in its entirety.

POINT II
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE ADMINISTRATION OF A
TRUST ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.
In the Brief of Cross-Appellee, Marian first misstates the Trustee's position,
and then argues that his position is against public policy. She argues no authority for that
conclusion, and none exists. For those reasons, this Court should reject the argument
entirely.
Marian argues that the "expressed purpose ofthe Contesting Children has been
to cut Marian off completely. Completing their design the Contesting Children left Marian
without any support, arguably taking to themselves more than $800,000.00 in the process."
(Brief of Cross-Appellee, p. 21.)3
The statement is flatly incorrect. As the trial court found, and as Marian cannot
deny, the Trustee has rendered to Marian every provision accorded to her under the
Restatement. Accordingly, Marian has the use of the Flake family home at no cost, with
most utilities paid, and also was provided an automobile. All of this is in addition to the

3

Marian's Counsel continually uses the inappropriate term "Contesting Children."
Aside from its inaccuracy, the term is argumentative and intended as an epithet. The trial
court disallowed the use of the term upon the objection of the Trustee's counsel. This Court
should do the same.
4

other assets, income, and family support she already possesses or to which she has access.
Because the Trustee believes the 1987 Trust Agreement was folly superceded by the
Restatement, he did not provide Marian with any benefits to which she might have been
entitled under that document. Marian's argument is also incorrect because there has never
been any evidence to support her speculative claim that the Trust estate is worth more than
$800,000.00. The Trustee's detailed accounting to the trial court directly contradicts the
claim, and Marian has never objected to it.
It is noteworthy that Marian cites no legal authority for her claim that the
Trustee's administration of the Trust is against public policy. Marian challenges some of the
cases cited in the Brief of Cross-Appellant, on other issues, and then tries to extrapolate from
editorial board comments published with the Uniform Probate Code to support her argument.
(See Brief of Cross-Appellee, pp. 20-24). None of those authorities suggest that Almon
could not execute the Restatement, amending and fully superceding the 1987 Trust
Agreement, and thereby limit his provision for Marian. The Trustee is aware of no authority
for such a proposition. Indeed, the argument would potentially undermine thousands of
private trust agreements based upon the highly subjective interpretation of the term
"destitute."
In several instances this Court has addressed the application of public policy
to the enforcement of contracts. In Nielsen v. O 'Reilly, et al, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992), the
Utah Supreme Court upheld a judgment which denied the plaintiff s recovery of prejudgment
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interest from an insurance company in excess of policy limits. The plaintiff claimed that as
a matter of public policy the prejudgment interest should be awarded. In its ruling this Court
stated as follows: "we reiterate the public policy requirement that absent legislative direction
to the contrary, contract provisions are to be enforced as written." Id. at 670. Thus, it is a
general rule of law that private contracts will not be disturbed unless there is some contrary
public policy, perhaps based upon a legislative declaration.
In certain areas of the law, this Court has set public policy limits on the
enforcement of contracts. For example, on grounds of public policy, parties to a contract
generally may not exempt a seller of a product from strict tort liability for physical harm to
a user or consumer. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, et al, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah
1996). The Court has also has indicated that it does not favor contracts purporting to limit
other kinds of tort liability, and may sometimes declare them invalid as against public policy.
DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company, 663 P.2d 433, 437 (Utah 1983). The Utah Court of
Appeals has held that on the ground of public policy the law will not permit a contract
protecting a person against his own fraud. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging
Specialists, Inc., etal, 937 P.2d 1274,1280 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotingZamZ> v. Bangart,
525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974)). The Court of Appeals has also held that in some
circumstances pre-nuptial agreements may be contrary to public policy. Neilson v. Neilson,
780 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

6

The Trustee's research, however, reveals no case or statutory authority for the
notion that public policy limits a person's right to dispose of his estate by inter vivos trust,
even if that disposition limits what a survivor otherwise might be entitled to receive. For
those reasons, the Court should reject Marian's public policy argument in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reject the arguments set forth
in the Brief of Cross-Appellee and should rule in accordance with the facts and law set forth
in the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
DATED this j?

day of March, 2002.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

MATTHEW C. BARNECK
Attorneys for Trustee and
Personal Representative
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing instrument
was mailed,firstclass, postage prepaid, on this <r day of March, 2002, to the following:

Loren D. Martin, Esq.
MARTIN & NELSON, P.C.
136 East South Temple, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1611

#14776-0001
893938. WPD
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ADDENDUM
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MARTIN & NELSON
A Professional Corporation
Loren D.Martin (2101)
Mail: PO Box 11590
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400
Sale Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073

SEwOhO
TO !3T
DISTPW

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
800 W. State Street, Farrr.lr.ctcr., Utah 8^025

In the Matter of the Estate of:
:
ALMON J. FLAKE,
deceased.

ORDER
Re: Temporary Support
Probate No: 99-37-00264
Judge:
Jon M. Memmott

This came before the Court for hearing on the issue of Temporary Support on Thursday,
Februarv- 10, 2000. Present were: Joel Flake, Trustee, and his counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. Marian
Flake was present with her counsel, Loren D. Martin. Others were also present. Witnesses were
sworn and testimony was taken. The Court, giving careful scrutiny to this matter, being
sufficiently advised, it is HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Joel Flake, the present trustee of The Almon J. Flake Trust shall pay to

Marian Flake $1,000.00 per month until further order of this Court.
2.

Payments shall commence for the month of February, 2000.

3.

Payments shall be delivered to Marian to arrive at her residence for the month of

Februarv* and shall be delivered and arrive at the residence of Marian Flake no later than 5:00 P M

1

on or prior to the expiration of the last day of the month every month thereafter until further
ordered.
DATED this <S&~"3ay of February, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

m.flwJg-

JON M. MEMMOTT
District Judge
Approved as to form & Content:

D. Bruce Oliver
Counsel for Joel Flake, Trustee
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